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Delinquent Networks

Listed author(s):
  • Coralio Ballester
  • Antoni Calvó-Armengol
  • Yves Zenou

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. (JEL: A14, C72, K42, L14) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 8 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 34-61

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:1:p:34-61
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