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Delinquent Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Ballester, Coralio

    () (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni

    (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

  • Zenou, Yves

    () (Monash University)

Abstract

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are modeled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbors. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. Using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006), we characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy, which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduction, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex since it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Ballester, Coralio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2009. "Delinquent Networks," IZA Discussion Papers 4122, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    key group; delinquency decision; social networks; NP-hard problem; crime policies;

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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