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Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaodong Liu

    (University of Colorado at Boulder)

  • Eleonora Patacchini

    (La Sapienza University of Rome, EIEF and CEPR)

  • Yves Zenou

    (Stockholm University, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) and GAINS)

  • Lung-Fei Lee

    (The Ohio State University)

Abstract

We analyze delinquent networks of adolescents in the United States. We develop a dynamic network formation model showing who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest possible reduction in aggregate crime level. We then structurally estimate our model using data on criminal behaviors of adolescents in the United States (AddHealth data). Compared to other criminals, key players are more likely to be male, have less educated parents, are less attached to religion and feel socially more excluded. We also find that, even though some criminals are not very active in criminal activities, they can be key players because they have a crucial position in the network in terms of betweenness centrality.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaodong Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou & Lung-Fei Lee, 2012. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Working Papers 2012.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Bonacich Centrality; Dynamic Network Formation; Crime Policies;

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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