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Unraveling Public Good Games

Author

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  • Pablo Brañas-Garza

    () (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

  • María Paz Espinosa

    () (Universidad del País Vasco)

Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Brañas-Garza & María Paz Espinosa, 2008. "Unraveling Public Good Games," ThE Papers 08/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  • Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Coralio Ballester & Pablo Brañas-Garza & María Paz Espinosa, 2008. "Peer effects in public contributions: theory and experimental evidence," ThE Papers 08/04, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    2. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Olusegun A. Oyediran & M.Fernanda Rivas, 2010. "An experimental test of prejudice about foreign people," ThE Papers 10/04, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public good game; end game effect; beliefs.;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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