Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016
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- Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 500-512, August.
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Keywords
Public goods; Restart effect;Statistics
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