Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental
La presente investigación tiene dos objetivos básicos. Primero, se utilizarán elementos de la Teoría de Juegos Evolutivos para evaluar la estabilidad de distintos tipos de preferencias en el contexto de la explotación de un recurso de propiedad común. En particular, analizaremos la evolución de preferencias egoístas, altruistas y envidiosas usando un “enfoque evolutivo indirecto” como el propuesto por Bester y Güth (1998). Los resultados básicos de nuestro modelo teórico plantean que en un escenario de información completa las preferencias evolutivamente estables serán envidiosas, las que implican un nivel de esfuerzo por sobre el nivel sugerido por el equilibrio Nash. En cambio, en términos de información incompleta las preferencias que prevalecerán serán las egoístas. Un segundo objetivo es evaluar experimentalmente las predicciones teóricas encontradas en la primera parte de este trabajo. Para este propósito se realizan dos tratamientos distintos del experimento estándar de un juego de explo
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Volume (Year): 32 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 Year 2005 (December)
Pages: 159-186
| Handle: | RePEc:udc:esteco:v:32:y:2005:i:2:p:159-186 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/ More information through EDIRC
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