Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups
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Citations
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- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2009.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 813-829, July.
- Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2002. "Equilibrium Vengeance," CESifo Working Paper Series 766, CESifo.
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Guttman, Joel M., 2013. "On the evolution of conditional cooperation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 15-34.
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