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Toward a neo-Darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics

  • Burnham, Terence C.
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    There is a schism within economics between the neoclassical and behavioral schools. A primary cause of the behavioral ascent is the experimental evidence of deviations between actual behavior and the neoclassical prediction of behavior. While behavioral scholars have documented these “anomalies,” they have made little progress explaining the origin of such behavior. This paper proposes a biological and evolutionary foundation for the anomalies of behavioral economics by separating proximate and ultimate causation. Such a foundation may allow for a re-uniting of economics; a neo-Darwinian synthesis of neoclassical and behavioral economics.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 90 (2013)
    Issue (Month): S ()
    Pages: S113-S127

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:90:y:2013:i:s:p:s113-s127
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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