Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia
Implementing the ultimatum game experimentally in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the monthly expenditure of the average participant. Contrary to predictions in the literature, the results show no evidence of approaching the sub-game perfect, selfish outcomes. Responders seem to be just as willing to reject a given percentage offer at high stakes as at low stakes, and Proposers make slightly less selfish offers as the stakes increase.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1995|
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