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Trust and social efficiencies

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  • Robert W. Rosenthal

Abstract

In a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, if extra costs are associated with the verifications built into strategies that could otherwise produce Pareto efficient equilibria, the attainment of efficient play becomes problematical. Evolutionary-game versions of this dilemma are studied here in an attempt to understand the difficulties societies face in maintaining efficient interactions mediated by trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Rosenthal, 2001. "Trust and social efficiencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(3), pages 413-428.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2003. "Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8n49r3t2, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    3. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0xp29105, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.

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