Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?
This essay provides an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary approach and evolutionary game theory (EGT). We shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen's theory of socioeconomic evolution to the discussion on the application of EGT to social environments. We also investigate to what extent elements of EGT can be used to formalize some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. The methodological imperatives laid down by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach, are presented. We provide an analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of Veblen's evolutionary approach. To better understand the main principles and rationale behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analyzing issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, we discuss this nontraditional approach and its basic concepts. Finally, the main characteristics of EGT are contrasted with Veblen's principles.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Issues 3.XXXVII(2004): pp. 585-610|
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