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Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?

Author

Listed:
  • Villena, Mauricio G.
  • Villena, Marcelo J.

Abstract

This essay provides an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary approach and evolutionary game theory (EGT). We shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen's theory of socioeconomic evolution to the discussion on the application of EGT to social environments. We also investigate to what extent elements of EGT can be used to formalize some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. The methodological imperatives laid down by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach, are presented. We provide an analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of Veblen's evolutionary approach. To better understand the main principles and rationale behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analyzing issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, we discuss this nontraditional approach and its basic concepts. Finally, the main characteristics of EGT are contrasted with Veblen's principles.

Suggested Citation

  • Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," MPRA Paper 28889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28889
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28889/1/MPRA_paper_28889.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Rutherford,Malcolm, 1996. "Institutions in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521574471.
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    6. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1993. "An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms," Working papers 9323, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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    8. Guth, Werner, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(4), pages 323-344.
    9. Rutherford, Malcolm, 1998. "Veblen's Evolutionary Programme: A Promise Unfulfilled," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(4), pages 463-477, July.
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    13. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
    14. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2010. "On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives," MPRA Paper 35917, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Mar 2010.
    2. Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt, 2013. "Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
    3. repec:cys:ecocyb:v:50:y:2017:i:1:p:281-302 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Heinrich, Torsten, 2016. "The Narrow and the Broad Approach to Evolutionary Modeling in Economics," MPRA Paper 75797, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. César A.Salazar & Mauricio G.Villena, 2005. "Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 32(2 Year 20), pages 159-186, December.
    6. Geoffrey Hodgson & Kainan Huang, 2012. "Evolutionary game theory and evolutionary economics: are they different species?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Evolutionary Economics; Evolutionary; Game Theory; Games;

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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