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OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach

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  • Wood, Aaron D.
  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Finnoff, David

Abstract

A methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling is used to study OPEC and the Seven Sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s. An evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations, energy-specific variables, and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem. An agent-based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Wood, Aaron D. & Mason, Charles F. & Finnoff, David, 2016. "OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PB), pages 66-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:132:y:2016:i:pb:p:66-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.011
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