IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1291.html

International Trade in Exhaustible Resources: A Cartel-Competitive Fringe Model

Author

Listed:
  • Karp, Larry
  • Tahvonen, Olli

Abstract

We characterize the open-loop and the Markov-Perfect Stackelberg equilibria for a differential game in which a cartel and a fringe extract a non-renewable resource. Both agents have stock dependent costs. The comparison of initial market shares, across different equilibria, depends on which firm has the cost advantage. The cartel's steady-state market share is largest in the open-loop equilibrium and the smallest in the competitive equilibrium. The initial price may be larger in the Markov equilibria (relative to the open-loop equilibrium), so less market power is consistent with an equilibrium that appears less competitive. The benefit to cartelization increases with market share.

Suggested Citation

  • Karp, Larry & Tahvonen, Olli, 1996. "International Trade in Exhaustible Resources: A Cartel-Competitive Fringe Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 1291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1291
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1291
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cees Withagen, 1998. "Untested Hypotheses in Non-Renewable Resource Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 623-634, April.
    2. Groot, Fons & Withagen, Cees & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 287-306, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1291. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.