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Unbeatable Imitation

Author

Listed:
  • Duersch, Peter
  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Schipper, Burkhard C.

Abstract

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent.

Suggested Citation

  • Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2010. "Unbeatable Imitation," Working Papers 0499, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0499
    Note: This paper is part of http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/view/schriftenreihen/sr-3.html
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. “Unbeatable Imitation,” P. Duersch, J. Oechssler & B. C. Schipper (2012)
      by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2012-09-25 13:38:20

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," Working Papers 0500, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    2. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    3. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    4. David M. Newbery & Thomas P. Greve, 2015. "The robustness of industrial commodity oligopoly pricing strategies," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1540, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Schipper, Burkhard C, 2011. "Strategic control of myopic best reply in repeated games," MPRA Paper 30219, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Fosco, Constanza & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 641-658, May.
    7. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.
    8. repec:zbw:rwirep:0497 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Leininger, Wolfgang & Moghadam, Hamed M., 2014. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Oligopoly. A Non-Walrasian Result," Ruhr Economic Papers 497, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    10. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Joerg & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," MPRA Paper 20864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Burkhard Schipper & Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler, 2011. "Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games," Working Papers 26, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    12. Wolfgang Leininger & Hamed Moghadam, 2014. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Oligopoly. A Non-Walrasian Result," Ruhr Economic Papers 0497, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imitate-the-best; learning; symmetric games; relative payoffs; zero- sum games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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