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Supermodular games and potential games

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  • Branzei, Rodica
  • Mallozzi, Lina
  • Tijs, Stef

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  • Branzei, Rodica & Mallozzi, Lina & Tijs, Stef, 2003. "Supermodular games and potential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 39-49, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:39:y:2003:i:1-2:p:39-49
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giovanni Facchini & Freek van Megen & Peter Borm & Stef Tijs, 1997. "Congestion Models And Weighted Bayesian Potential Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 193-206.
    2. Slade, Margaret E, 1994. "What Does an Oligopoly Maximize?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 45-61, March.
    3. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    4. Mallozzi, L. & Tijs, S.H. & Voorneveld, M., 2000. "Infinite hierarchical potential games," Other publications TiSEM 99c46c85-c255-4d99-94b6-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    2. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2008. "A Class of Best-Response Potential Games," Working Papers 635, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Arsen Palestini & Ilaria Poggio, 2015. "A Bayesian potential game to illustrate heterogeneity in cost/benefit characteristics," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(1), pages 23-39, March.
    4. Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games," Working Papers 1112, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Fioravante Patrone & Lucia Pusillo & Stef Tijs, 2007. "Multicriteria games and potentials," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(1), pages 138-145, July.
    6. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Joerg & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," MPRA Paper 20864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 168-171.
    8. Conde, Eduardo & Candia, Alfredo, 2007. "Minimax regret spanning arborescences under uncertain costs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 182(2), pages 561-577, October.
    9. Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "Ordinal potentials in smooth games," ECON - Working Papers 265, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.
    11. David González-Sánchez & Onésimo Hernández-Lerma, 2014. "Dynamic Potential Games: The Discrete-Time Stochastic Case," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 309-328, September.
    12. Lina Mallozzi, 2013. "An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 21(3), pages 523-539, September.
    13. Zhang, Guoquan & Shang, Jennifer & Yildirim, Pinar, 2016. "Optimal pricing for group buying with network effects," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 69-82.
    14. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Lia, 2005. "Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 285-301, April.

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