Weighted congestion games with separable preferences
Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.
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- Giovanni Facchini & Freek van Megen & Peter Borm & Stef Tijs, 1997.
"Congestion Models And Weighted Bayesian Potential Games,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 193-206, March.
- Facchini, G. & van Megen, F.J.C. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1997. "Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games," Other publications TiSEM c80cf83c-bb5a-4cc2-a12c-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hollard, Guillaume, 2000. "On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 283-287, March.
- Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
- Milchtaich, Igal, 2006. "Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 321-346, November.
- Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
- Correa, José R. & Schulz, Andreas S. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2008. "A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 457-469, November.
- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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