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Congestion Games Revisited

Author

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  • Nikolai S. Kukushkin

    (Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center)

Abstract

Strategic games are considered where the players derive their utilities from participation in certain 'processes.' Two subclasses consisting exclusively of potential games are singled out. In the first, players choose where to participate, but there is a unique way of participation, the same for all players. In the second, the participation structure is fixed, but each player may have an arbitrary set of strategies. In both cases, the players sum up the intermediate utilities; thus the first class essentially coincides with that of congestion games. The necessity of additivity in either case is proven.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2004. "Congestion Games Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0412010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412010
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Voorneveld & Peter Borm & Freek Van Megen & Stef Tijs & Giovanni Facchini, 1999. "Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 283-299.
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    9. repec:fth:tilbur:9998 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
    11. Kukushkin Nikolai S., 1994. "A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-192, September.
    12. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
    13. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
    14. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kukushkin, Nikolai, 2019. "Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities," MPRA Paper 93588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018. "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 331-340.
    3. Panov, P., 2017. "Nash Equilibria in the Facility Location Problem with Externalities," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 28-42.
    4. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2015. "Cournot tatonnement and potentials," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 117-127.
    5. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-177, February.
    6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," MPRA Paper 55499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2009. "Existence of Pure Strategies Nash Equilibria in Social Interaction Games with Dyadic Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 7279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Rosenthal's potential and a discrete version of the Debreu--Gorman Theorem," MPRA Paper 54171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2011. "Games of social interactions with local and global externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-90, April.
    10. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2017. "Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-12.
    11. Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2017. "Inseparables: exact potentials and addition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1176-1181.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Potential games; Congestion games; Additive aggregation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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