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Congestion Games Revisited

Author Info

  • Nikolai S. Kukushkin

    (Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center)

Abstract

Strategic games are considered where the players derive their utilities from participation in certain 'processes.' Two subclasses consisting exclusively of potential games are singled out. In the first, players choose where to participate, but there is a unique way of participation, the same for all players. In the second, the participation structure is fixed, but each player may have an arbitrary set of strategies. In both cases, the players sum up the intermediate utilities; thus the first class essentially coincides with that of congestion games. The necessity of additivity in either case is proven.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0412/0412010.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0412010.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 22 Dec 2004
Date of revision: 02 Feb 2006
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412010
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 26
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Potential games; Congestion games; Additive aggregation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-237, January.
  2. Voorneveld, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C. & Tijs, S.H. & Facchini, G., 1999. "Congestion games and potentials reconsidered," Other publications TiSEM a2b8c559-8a5b-4a4a-8205-9, School of Economics and Management.
  3. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
  4. Voorneveld, Mark & Norde, Henk, 1997. "A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 235-242, May.
  5. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  6. repec:dgr:kubcen:199998 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
  8. Hollard, Guillaume, 2000. "On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 283-287, March.
  9. Kukushkin Nikolai S., 1994. "A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-192, September.
  10. repec:fth:tilbur:9998 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  12. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-169686 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
  14. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2009. "Existence of Pure Strategies Nash Equilibria in Social Interaction Games with Dyadic Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 7279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Rosenthal's potential and a discrete version of the Debreu--Gorman Theorem," MPRA Paper 54171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Strong equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," MPRA Paper 55499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 147-177, February.
  5. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2012. "Cournot tatonnement and potentials," MPRA Paper 43188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2011. "Games of social interactions with local and global externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-90, April.

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