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A characterisation of ordinal potential games

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  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Norde, H.W.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order condition on the strategy space.This order condition is automatically satisfied if the strategy space is countable.
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Suggested Citation

  • Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1997. "A characterisation of ordinal potential games," Other publications TiSEM b7112a05-1878-4d36-beb3-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b7112a05-1878-4d36-beb3-fda3b76dfb2f
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007. "Congestion games revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
    2. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2008. "Ordinal Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 177-194.
    3. Christian Ewerhart, 2020. "Ordinal potentials in smooth games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(4), pages 1069-1100, November.
    4. Hannu Salonen, 2013. "Utilitarian Preferences and Potential Games," Discussion Papers 85, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-177, February.
    6. Fioravante Patrone & Lucia Pusillo & Stef Tijs, 2007. "Multicriteria games and potentials," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(1), pages 138-145, July.
    7. Koster, M.A.L. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects," Other publications TiSEM aec6651a-5174-4670-ae62-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Hódsági, Kristóf & Szabó, György, 2019. "Bursts in three-strategy evolutionary ordinal potential games on a square lattice," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 525(C), pages 1379-1387.
    9. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    10. Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games and Household Consumption," MPRA Paper 6818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
    12. M. Koster & H. Reijnierse & M. Voorneveld, 2003. "Voluntary Contributions to Multiple Public Projects," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 25-50, January.
    13. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2010. "On continuous ordinal potential games," MPRA Paper 20713, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Andrea Collevecchio & Hlafo Alfie Mimun & Matteo Quattropani & Marco Scarsini, 2024. "Basins of Attraction in Two-Player Random Ordinal Potential Games," Papers 2407.05460, arXiv.org.
    15. Takuya Iimura, 2020. "Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 681-697, September.
    16. T. Demuynck & A. Schollaert, 2006. "Note on State Dependent Mutations as an Equilibrium Refinement Device," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 06/408, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    17. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 387-392, May.
    18. Federico Echenique & Joseph Root & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2024. "Stable matching as transportation," Papers 2402.13378, arXiv.org.
    19. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2001. "Learning in Games by Random Sampling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 55-84, May.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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