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Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players

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  • Takuya Iimura

    (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

Abstract

We prove some interesting properties of unilaterally competitive games when there are more than two players. We show that such games possess: (1) a Nash equilibrium, (2) maximin-solvability, (3) strong solvability in the sense of Nash, and (4) weak acyclicity, all in pure strategies of finite or infinite games.

Suggested Citation

  • Takuya Iimura, 2020. "Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 681-697, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00724-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00724-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Takuya Iimura & Toshimasa Maruta & Takahiro Watanabe, 2019. "Equilibria in games with weak payoff externalities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 245-258, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Renato Soeiro & Alberto A. Pinto, 2022. "A Note on Type-Symmetries in Finite Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(24), pages 1-13, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unilaterally competitive games; Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium; Maximin; Strongly solvable games; Weak acyclicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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