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Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer

  • Armstrong, Mark
  • Huck, Steffen

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20356.

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Date of creation: Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20356
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