Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study
We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though, and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly. These results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits. In oligopoly, entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path. In monopoly, taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit-maximizing price. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Sonnemans, J., 2002.
"Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment,"
Other publications TiSEM
a6a771c5-31ba-4193-8f76-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 973-997.
- Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Gérard P. Cachon & Colin F. Camerer, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-194.
- Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
- Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
- F. T. Dolbear & L. B. Lave & G. Bowman & A. Lieberman & E. Prescott & F. Rueter & R. Sherman, 1968. "Collusion in Oligopoly: An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers and Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 240-259.
- Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
- Paul Klemperer, 2001.
"How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions,"
2002-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Nov 2001.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3215, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- McMillan, John, 1995. "Why auction the spectrum?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-199, April.
- Reinhard Selten & Michael Mitzkewitz & Gerald R. Uhlich, 1997.
"Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 517-556, May.
- Selten,Reinhard & Mitzkewitz,Michael & Uhlich,Gerald, . "Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players," Discussion Paper Serie B 106, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2005. "Auctions, Market Prices and the Risk Attitude Effect," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-025/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 1997. "Tien misverstanden over veilingen," Other publications TiSEM c929fa51-e738-4878-8956-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September.
- Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
- Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-1316, December.
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1998.
"Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?,"
- Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2000. "Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 39-57, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:769-791. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.