Through Trial & Error to Collusion
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges to a collusive outcome.
|Date of creation:||19 Nov 1998|
|Date of revision:||24 Nov 1998|
|Note:||Pages: 12; figure included in the second file|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://188.8.131.52 |
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