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Which one should I imitate?

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  • Schlag, Karl H.

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  • Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:31:y:1999:i:4:p:493-522
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October.
    2. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
    3. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    4. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    6. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    7. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    8. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125.
    9. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
    10. Jonas Bjoernerstedt & Karl H. Schlag, "undated". "On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior," ELSE working papers 029, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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