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Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games

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  • Cressman, R.

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  • Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:34:y:1997:i:1:p:1-19
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    1. J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 440, David K. Levine.
    2. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
    3. Cressman R., 1995. "Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 237-253, November.
    4. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
    5. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    6. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    7. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    8. Balkenborg, Dieter & Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 314, University of Bonn, Germany.
    9. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
    10. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    11. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
    12. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuval Heller, 2014. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(6), pages 1857-1863, June.
    2. Heller, Yuval, 2014. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 132-136.
    3. Sivan Frenkel & Yuval Heller & Roee Teper, 2017. "The Endowment Effect as a Blessing," Working Papers 2017-06, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    4. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
    5. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2012. "The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 1-21, February.
    6. Dawid, Herbert, 1999. "On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 265-280, May.
    7. Antoci, Angelo & Sacco, Pier Luigi & Zarri, Luca, 2004. "Endogenous Preferences and Private Provision of Public Goods: a Double Critical Mass Model," AICCON Working Papers 2-2004, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    8. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 187-214, June.
    9. Amann, Erwin & Yang, Chun-Lei, 1998. "Sophistication and the persistence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 91-105, September.
    10. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2015. "Stable Observable Behavior," MPRA Paper 63013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
    12. Marc Harper & Dashiell Fryer, 2015. "Lyapunov Functions for Time-Scale Dynamics on Riemannian Geometries of the Simplex," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 318-333, September.
    13. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    14. Roee Teper, 2014. "The Endowment Effect as a Blessing," Working Paper 5862, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    15. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli," MPRA Paper 58255, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Cressman, R., 2000. "Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 183-205, August.
    17. Oyama, Daisuke & Sandholm, William H. & Tercieux, Olivier, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    18. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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