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An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime

  • Shahi, Chander
  • Kant, Shashi
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389-9341(06)00103-1
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Forest Policy and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 7 (April)
    Pages: 763-775

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:9:y:2007:i:7:p:763-775
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

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    1. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
    2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
    3. Innes, John L., 2003. "The incorporation of research into attempts to improve forest policy in British Columbia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 349-359, December.
    4. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
    5. Kumar, Sanjay, 2002. "Does "Participation" in Common Pool Resource Management Help the Poor? A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 763-782, May.
    6. Shashi Kant & R. Albert Berry, 2001. "A Theoretical Model of Optimal Forest Resource Regimes in Developing Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 331-355, June.
    7. D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
    8. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994.
    9. Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-104, July.
    10. Hill, I. & SHields, D., 1998. "Incentives for Joint Forest Management in India. Analytical Methods and Case Studies," Papers 394, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    11. Kant, Shashi, 2000. "A dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-300, February.
    12. Ananda, Jayanath & Herath, Gamini, 2003. "Incorporating stakeholder values into regional forest planning: a value function approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 75-90, April.
    13. Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
    14. Smith,Vernon L., 2005. "Bargaining and Market Behavior," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521021487, September.
    15. Lars P. Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 651, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 47-66, Spring.
    17. Shashi Kant & J.C. Nautiyal & R.A. Berry, 1996. "Forests and economic welfare," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 23(2), pages 31-43, May.
    18. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    19. Jose Apesteguia, 2001. "Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse24_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
    20. Metcalfe, J S, 1994. "Evolutionary Economics and Technology Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 931-44, July.
    21. Klooster, Daniel, 2000. "Institutional Choice, Community, and Struggle: A Case Study of Forest Co-Management in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-20, January.
    22. Colander, David, 2000. "The Death of Neoclassical Economics," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(02), pages 127-143, June.
    23. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
    24. Lise, Wietze, 2001. "Estimating a Game Theoretic Model," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 18(2), pages 141-57, October.
    25. Gebremedhin, Berhanu & Pender, John & Tesfay, Girmay, 2003. "Community natural resource management: the case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(01), pages 129-148, February.
    26. Daniel McFadden, 1998. "Rationality for Economists?," Working Papers 98-09-086, Santa Fe Institute.
    27. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information 9903001, EconWPA, revised 12 Mar 1999.
    28. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
    29. Richard H. Thaler, 2000. "From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 133-141, Winter.
    30. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January.
    31. Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998. "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1101-1117, November.
    32. Arild Angelsen, 2001. "Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299.
    33. Kant, Shashi, 2003. "Extending the boundaries of forest economics," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 39-56, January.
    34. Ligon, Ethan & Narain, Urvashi, 1999. "Government Management of Village Commons: Comparing Two Forest Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 272-289, May.
    35. Leskinen, Leena A., 2004. "Purposes and challenges of public participation in regional and local forestry in Finland," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 605-618, October.
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