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An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime

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  • Shahi, Chander
  • Kant, Shashi

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  • Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:9:y:2007:i:7:p:763-775
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    Cited by:

    1. Reynolds, Travis W., 2012. "Institutional Determinants of Success Among Forestry-Based Carbon Sequestration Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 542-554.
    2. Limaei, Soleiman Mohammadi, 2010. "Mixed strategy game theory, application in forest industry," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(7), pages 527-531, September.
    3. Xie, Hualin & Wang, Wei & Zhang, Xinmin, 2018. "Evolutionary game and simulation of management strategies of fallow cultivated land: A case study in Hunan province, China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 86-97.
    4. Mehdi Zandebasiri & José António Filipe & Javad Soosani & Mehdi Pourhashemi & Luca Salvati & Mário Nuno Mata & Pedro Neves Mata, 2020. "An Incomplete Information Static Game Evaluating Community-Based Forest Management in Zagros, Iran," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-14, February.
    5. Moradi, Sohrab & Limaei, Soleiman Mohammadi, 2018. "Multi-objective game theory model and fuzzy programing approach for sustainable watershed management," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 363-371.
    6. Kumar, Pradeep & Kant, Shashi, 2016. "Revealed social preferences and joint forest management outcomes," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 37-45.
    7. Soltani, Arezoo & Sankhayan, Prem Lall & Hofstad, Ole, 2016. "Playing forest governance games: State-village conflict in Iran," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-261.

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