A Theoretical Model of Optimal Forest Resource Regimes in Developing Economies
The standard economic theory of natural-resource management has its roots in a conventional economic theory of commons that overlooked the role of institutional structures and the transaction costs. Hence, it has not been able to explain cases of successful management of forests as common property. An economic model in-corporating the role of transaction costs has been developed. A mathematical form that can represent the general nature of a transaction function is suggested. Static models for separable and nonseparable transformation and transaction functions are discussed. The possibility of different resource regimes being optimal in different socioeconomic conditions is highlighted.
Volume (Year): 157 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Bell, Frederick W, 1972. "Technological Externalities and Common-Property Resources: An Empirical Study of the U. S. Northern Lobster Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(1), pages 148-158, Jan.-Feb..
- Pranab Bardhan, 1993. "Symposium on Management of Local Commons," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 87-92, Fall.
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