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Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems

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  • Ostrom, Elinor

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

Elinor Ostrom delivered her Prize Lecture on 8 December 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. She was introduced by Professor Bertil Holmlund, Chairman of the Economic Sciences Prize Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Ostrom, Elinor, 2009. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2009-4, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2009_004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Complex; economic; systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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