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Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment With One-Way Communication

Author

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  • Anastasios Koukoumelis

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

  • M. Vittoria Levati

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

  • Johannes Weisser

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. The relevance of one person's words is assessed by assigning exogenously the role of the "communicator" to one group member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication, we ï¬ nd that, compared to a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with no communication, one-way communication signiï¬ cantly increases contributions and renders them stable over time. Moreover, the positive effects of one-way communication persist even when communication is one-shot.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Johannes Weisser, 2009. "Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment With One-Way Communication," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-106, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-106
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    Cited by:

    1. Natalia Montinari & Antonio Nicolò & Regine Oexl, 2016. "The gift of being chosen," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 460-479, June.
    2. Mantilla, Cesar, 2014. "Congruent Behavior without Interpersonal Commitment: Evidence from a Common Pool Resource Game," IAST Working Papers 14-11, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    3. Mantilla, César, 2015. "Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 215-226.
    4. Natalia Montinari & Antonio Nicolo & Regine Oexl, 2012. "Mediocrity and induced reciprocity," Working Papers 2012-19, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    5. Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Johannes Weisser, 2010. "A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication and income heterogeneity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-094, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    6. Pablo Hernandez & Dylan Minor & Dana Sisak, 2015. "Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-040, Harvard Business School.
    7. Crettez, Bertrand & Deloche, Régis, 2013. "On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 66-72.
    8. Zultan, Ro’i, 2012. "Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 425-434.
    9. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Page, Lionel & Dulleck, Uwe, 2015. "Promoting pro-social behavior with public statements of good intent," MPRA Paper 80072, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 May 2017.
    10. Johannes Weisser, 2011. "Leading by Words in Privileged Groups," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-066, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    11. repec:kap:expeco:v:21:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9535-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Lopera Baena, Maria Adelaida, 2016. "Evidence of Conditional and Unconditional Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: Experimental Evidence from Mali," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145797, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Mantilla, Cesar, 2015. "To suggest is to commit? A common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 13-20.
    14. Jordi Brandts & Christina Rott & Carles Solà, 2016. "Not just like starting over - Leadership and revivification of cooperation in groups," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(4), pages 792-818, December.
    15. repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9512-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Discussion Paper 2010-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    17. Martin Daniel Siyaranamual, 2013. "Social Interaction and Public Goods Provision: A Case of Waste Management in Bandung, Indonesia," Working Papers in Economics and Development Studies (WoPEDS) 201312, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University, revised May 2013.
    18. Hannes Rusch, 2013. "What niche did human cooperativeness evolve in?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201327, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    19. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2011. "Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)," Discussion Paper 2011-139, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    20. Feltovich, Nick & Grossman, Philip J., 2015. "How does the effect of pre-play suggestions vary with group size? Experimental evidence from a threshold public-good game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 263-280.
    21. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by TILEC DP 2011-055)," Discussion Paper 2010-016, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    22. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2011. "Lying About What you Know or About What you do? (replaces TILEC DP 2010-016)," Discussion Paper 2011-055, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    23. Jordi Brandts & Christina Rott & Carles Solà, 2015. "Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups," Working Papers 775, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods experiment; Computer-mediated communication; Cheap-talk; Cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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