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Understanding Leadership A Coordination Theory

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  • Nicolai J. Foss

Abstract

Important aspects of leadership behavior can be rendered intelligible through a focus on coordination games. The concept of common knowledge is shown to be particularly important to understanding leadership. Thus, leaders may establish common knowledge conditions and assist the coordination of strategies in this way, or make decisions in situations where coordination problems persist in spite of common knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Leadership A Coordination Theory," DRUID Working Papers 99-3, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:aal:abbswp:99-3
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    File URL: http://www3.druid.dk/wp/19990003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Foss, Nicolai Juul, 1993. "Theories of the Firm: Contractual and Competence Perspectives," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 127-144, May.
    3. Galesloot, Bob M. & Goyal, Sanjeev, 1997. "Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 249-264, October.
    4. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
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    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
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    8. Langlois, Richard N & Foss, Nicolai J, 1999. "Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 201-218.
    9. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Claude Meidinger & Marie Claire Villeval, 2002. "Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00178474, HAL.
    2. Banaszak, Ilona, 0. "Determinanty Sukcesu Współpracy Na Rynkach Rolniczych Na Przykładzie Grup Producentów Rolnych W Polsce," Village and Agriculture (WieÅ› i Rolnictwo), Polish Academy of Sciences (IRWiR PAN), Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, issue 1.
    3. Koukoumelis, Anastasios & Levati, M. Vittoria & Weisser, Johannes, 2012. "Leading by words: A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 379-390.
    4. Patrick Cohendet & Frédéric Creplet & Morad Diani & Olivier Dupouët & Eric Schenk, 2004. "Matching Communities and Hierarchies within the Firm," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 8(1), pages 27-48, March.
    5. Ash Amin & Patrick Cohendet, 2012. "The Firm as a ‘Platform of Communities': A Contribution to the Knowledge-based Approach of the Firm," Chapters,in: Handbook of Knowledge and Economics, chapter 18 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Organizing Economic Experiments The Role of Firms," DRUID Working Papers 99-5, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; management; organization;

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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