Austrian Economics and Game Theory a Preliminary Methodological Stocktaking
This paper discusses, from the perspective of Austrian economics, the merits and drawbacks of game theory in economics. It begins by arguing that Austrians have neglected game theory at their peril, and then argues that game theoretic reasoning may be one way of modelling key Austrian insights, although some aspects of game theory doesn’t square easily with Austrian economics. However, a major stumbling block for an Austrian acceptance of game theory may lie in the traditional Austrian resistance to formal methods.
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