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Austrian Economics and Game Theory a Preliminary Methodological Stocktaking

  • Nicolai J. Foss

This paper discusses, from the perspective of Austrian economics, the merits and drawbacks of game theory in economics. It begins by arguing that Austrians have neglected game theory at their peril, and then argues that game theoretic reasoning may be one way of modelling key Austrian insights, although some aspects of game theory doesn’t square easily with Austrian economics. However, a major stumbling block for an Austrian acceptance of game theory may lie in the traditional Austrian resistance to formal methods.

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File URL: http://www3.druid.dk/wp/19980028.pdf
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Paper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number 98-28.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:aal:abbswp:98-28
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.druid.dk/

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  1. Vickers, John, 1995. "Concepts of Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, January.
  2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  3. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
  5. Philip Mirowski, 1992. "What Were von Neumann and Morgenstern Trying to Accomplish?," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 24(5), pages 113-147, Supplemen.
  6. Andrew Colman, 1997. "Salience and focusing in pure coordination games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 61-81.
  7. Morgenstern, Oskar, 1972. "Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: An Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1163-89, December.
  8. Schotter, Andrew, 1991. "Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of Games," Working Papers 91-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  9. Radner, Roy, 1996. "Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1360-73, September.
  10. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
  11. Israel M. Kirzner, 1997. "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 60-85, March.
  12. Rizvi, S Abu Turab, 1994. "Game Theory to the Rescue?," Contributions to Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(0), pages 1-28.
  13. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
  14. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  15. Reder, Melvin W, 1982. "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-38, March.
  16. Nicolai Juul Foss, 1995. "More on “Hayek's Transformation”," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 345-364, Summer.
  17. Daniel Klein, 1997. "Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 319-335, December.
  18. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
  19. Witt, Ulrich, 1986. "Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 245-66.
  20. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-95, May.
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