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Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting

  • Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Accounting, Organizations and Society.

    Volume (Year): 28 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 2-3 ()
    Pages: 287-318

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:28:y:2003:i:2-3:p:287-318
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