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Pay Spread and Skewness, Employee Effort and Firm Productivity

  • Bingley, Paul

    ()

    (National Center for Register-based Research)

  • Eriksson, Tor

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)

We test predictions from theories of tournament, fairness and tastes for skewness about the effects of pay spread and skewness on employee effort and firm productivity. The data come from the population of 6,501 medium-to-large sized Danish private sector firms matched with all their employees during 1992-95. Potential simultaneity problems are addressed by instrumental variables provided by institutional variation in the income tax system. Differences in firm productivity effects between occupational groups and types of firms give support to the theories of fairness, tournaments and tastes for skewness. Only individual effort effects support tournament theory alone.

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File URL: http://www.hha.dk/nat/WPER/01-2_te.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 01-2.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:aareco:2001_002
Contact details of provider: Postal: The Aarhus School of Business, Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Phone: +45 89 486396
Fax: +45 8615 5175
Web page: http://www.asb.dk/departments/nat.aspx

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