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Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?

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Listed:
  • Main, Brian G M
  • O'Reilly, Charles A, III
  • Wade, James

Abstract

Tournament mechanisms suggest the need for ever larger rewards to motivate those at the highest organizational levels. But arguments for the efficiency of executive pay compression have also been made. This study reports the results of an empirical investigation of executive compensation using over two-hundred firms and in excess of two thousand executives per year over a five-year period. Results are consistent with the operation of tournaments but fail to find support for the empirical importance of considerations of pay equity at the top of corporations. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Main, Brian G M & O'Reilly, Charles A, III & Wade, James, 1993. "Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 606-628, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:11:y:1993:i:4:p:606-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    4. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
    5. Stephen A. Woodbury, 2009. "Unemployment," Chapters,in: Labor and Employment Law and Economics, chapter 17 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Seater, John J, 1979. "Job Search and Vacancy Contacts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 411-419, June.
    7. repec:fth:prinin:242 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Pissarides, C A, 1984. "Efficient Job Rejection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 97-108, Supplemen.
    9. Bruce D. Meyer, 1988. "Implications of the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiments For Theories of Unemployment and Policy Design," NBER Working Papers 2783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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