Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?
Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Under certain sets of assumptions, tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual output (players' scores) are both available. We find string support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence players performance. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lawrence F. Katz, 1986.
"Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation,"
NBER Working Papers
1906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:98:y:1990:i:6:p:1307-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.