Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.02.003
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- Deutscher, Christian & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver & DeVaro, Jed, 2020. "Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Tournaments; Promotions; Signaling;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
Statistics
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