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Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence

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  • Cassidy, Hugh
  • DeVaro, Jed
  • Kauhanen, Antti

Abstract

We extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across-firm mobility (within and across job levels). Evidence from worker-firm-linked Finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups. Controlling for worker performance (inferred from performance-related pay), within-firm promotion probabilities are increasing (and wage increases from promotion are decreasing) in educational attainment for some educational groups, with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions. Women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment. Across-firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across-firm lateral moves.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:126:y:2016:i:pa:p:140-166
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.016
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    3. Nick Deschacht, 2017. "Part-Time Work and Women’s Careers: a Decomposition of the Gender Promotion Gap," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 169-186, June.
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    7. Kouki, Amairisa & Sauer, Robert M., 2022. "Remote Work, Children's Health and the Racial Gap in Female Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 15072, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
    9. Philipp Grunau & Marco Pecoraro, 2017. "Educational mismatch and promotions to managerial positions: a test of the career mobility theory," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(12), pages 1226-1240, March.
    10. Mario Bossler & Philipp Grunau, 2020. "Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2977-2998, December.
    11. Ekinci, Emre, 2019. "Discretionary bonuses and turnover," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 30-49.
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    14. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
    15. Mohsen Javdani & Andrew McGee, 2018. "Labor market mobility and the early-career outcomes of immigrant men," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, December.
    16. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
    17. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
    18. David Wettstein & Ori Zax, 2018. "Promotion Policies of Workers who Observe their Ability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2509-2514.
    19. Zaharieva, Anna & Dawid, Herbert & Mitkova, Mariya, 2021. "Optimal Promotions of Competing Firms in a Frictional Labour Market with Organizational Hierarchies," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242337, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Deutscher, Christian & Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver & DeVaro, Jed, 2020. "Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    21. Yanay Farja & Avi Tillman & Ori Zax, 2022. "The Gender Gap: Looking at the Entire Distribution," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 34(1), pages 51-68, January.
    22. Leonora Risse, 2020. "Leaning in: Is higher confidence the key to women's career advancement?," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 23(1), pages 43-77.
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