Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital Acquisition
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
- Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 1-9.
- Levine, David I, 1993.
"Worth Waiting For? Delayed Compensation, Training, and Turnover in the United States and Japan,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 724-752, October.
- Levine, David I., 1991. "Worth Waiting For? Delayed Compensation, Training and Turnover in the United States and Japan," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt97m9v25n, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Timmis, Gerald C, 1990.
"Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 529-563, October.
- Jerry Timmins & Dan Bernhardt, 1985. "Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles," Working Papers 644, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, 1987.
"Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-476.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1984. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 708R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised 1985.
- Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
- Brown, James N, 1989. "Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job Training and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed within Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 971-991, December.
- Barth, Erling, 1997. "Firm-Specific Seniority and Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 495-506, July.
- Scoones, David, 2000. "Matching and competition for human capital," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 135-152, March.
- Robert H. Topel & Michael P. Ward, 1992. "Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 439-479.
- Chun Chang & Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "A framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 91-105, September.
- Canice Prendergast, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 523-534.
- Topel, Robert H, 1991.
"Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 145-176, February.
- Robert H. Topel, 1990. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," NBER Working Papers 3294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Corinne Langinier & Stephanie Lluis, 2015.
"Departure and Promotion of U.S. Patent Examiners: Do Patent Characteristics Matter?,"
1506, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2015.
- Langinier, Corinne & Lluis, Stéphanie, 2015. "Departure and Promotion of U.S. Patent Examiners: Do Patent Characteristics Matter?," Working Papers 2015-18, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2010. "The Layoff Rat Race," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(1), pages 185-210, March.
- Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2016. "Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 273-300.
- Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
- Ferreira, Priscila, 2009. "The determinants of promotions and firm separations," ISER Working Paper Series 2009-11, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
- Yijiang Wang, "undated". "Demand, Supply and Coordination: An Integrated Theory of the Division of Labor," Working Papers 0405, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
- Bas Klaauw & António Dias da Silva, 2011.
"Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1513-1548, October.
- Silva, António Dias da & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions Inside and Between Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Antonio Dias da Silva & Bas van der Klaauw, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions inside and between Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-084/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Frazer, Garth, 2006. "Learning the master's trade: Apprenticeship and human capital in Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 259-298, December.
- Joshua C. Pinkston, 2009.
"A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 367-394.
- Joshua C. Pinkston, 2006. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning With Testable Implications," Working Papers 390, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
- Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:16:y:1998:i:1:p:122-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.