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Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives

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  • Arya, Anil
  • Fellingham, John
  • Glover, Jonathan

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  • Arya, Anil & Fellingham, John & Glover, Jonathan, 1997. "Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 7-30, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:23:y:1997:i:1:p:7-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August.
    2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 777-795.
    4. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    5. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 755-785.
    6. Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan, 1995. "A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 507-521, August.
    7. Villadsen, Bente, 1995. "Communication and delegation in collusive agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 315-344.
    8. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Hemmer, Thomas, 1995. "On the interrelation between production technology, job design, and incentives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 209-245.
    10. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1407-1433.
    11. Arya, Anil & Young, Richard A. & Fellingham, John C., 1993. "Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-30.
    12. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    13. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 225-264.
    14. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
    15. Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 445-484.
    16. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    17. Timothy Smeeding, 1983. "The Size Distribution of Wage and Nonwage Compensation: Employer Cost versus Employee Value," NBER Chapters,in: The Measurement of Labor Cost, pages 237-286 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Fellingham, John C. & Newman, D. Paul & Suh, Yoon S., 1985. "Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 340-355, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter O. Christensen & Gerald A. Feltham, 2001. "Efficient Timing of Communication in Multiperiod Agencies," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 280-294.
    2. Rankin, Frederick W. & Sayre, Todd L., 2000. "The effects of performance separability and contract type on agent effort," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 683-695, October.
    3. Merchant, Kenneth A. & Van der Stede, Wim A. & Zheng, Liu, 2003. "Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 251-286.
    4. Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2003. "Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 287-318.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 525-541.
    6. repec:oup:jleorg:v:33:y:2017:i:3:p:475-506. is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2011. "The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1424-1437.
    8. Ladley, Daniel & Wilkinson, Ian & Young, Louise, 2015. "The impact of individual versus group rewards on work group performance and cooperation: A computational social science approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(11), pages 2412-2425.
    9. Friedman, Henry L., 2014. "Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 117-141.
    10. Fee, C. Edward & Hadlock, Charles J., 2004. "Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 3-38, February.
    11. Daniel Ladley & Ian Wilkinson & Louise Young, 2013. "The Evolution Of Cooperation In Business: Individual Vs. Group Incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/14, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

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