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Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

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  • Brunello, Giorgio
  • Graziano, Clara
  • Parigi, Bruno

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  • Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:1-2:p:133-161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Jason R & Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 448-481, October.
    2. Kato, Takao, 1997. "Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 455-467, July.
    3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    4. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 142-159, April.
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
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    8. Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & and Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 27-64, February.
    9. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    10. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. John M. Abowd & Michael Bognanno, 1995. "International Differences in Executive and Managerial Compensation," NBER Chapters,in: Differences and Changes in Wage Structures, pages 67-104 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 18, pages 315-341 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Giorgio Brunello & Clara Graziano & Bruno Parigi, 1999. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," Working Papers 1999.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    14. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-714, May.
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    16. Kato, Takao & Rockel, Mark, 1992. "Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 30-51, March.
    17. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-1199, December.
    18. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-148.
    19. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
    20. Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
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    23. Jones, Derek C. & Kato, Takao, 1996. "The determinants of chief executive compensation in transitional economies: Evidence from Bulgaria," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 319-336, October.
    24. Groves, Theodore & Yongmiao Hong & John McMillan & Barry Naughton, 1995. "China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 873-892, August.
    25. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & George T. Milkovich, 1987. "Compensation and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 2145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    2. Cao, Jerry & Liu, Qigui & Tian, Gary G., 2014. "Do venture capitalists play a monitoring role in an emerging market? Evidence from the pay–performance relationship of Chinese entrepreneurial firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 121-145.
    3. Ming-Yuan Chen, 2010. "The Components Of Managerial Pay Adjustments And Their Impact On Firm Performance," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(6), pages 582-608, December.
    4. Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
    5. Sergio Destefanis & Vania Sena, 2007. "Patterns of corporate governance and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(1), pages 27-40.
    6. Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2012. "Ownership concentration, monitoring, and optimal board structure," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3333-3346.
    7. Clara Graziano & Laura Rondi, 2015. "Market Competition or Family Ties: Which Prevails on Italian CEOs Pay?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5398, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Alessandro Rossi, 1999. "Incentives in Managerial Compensation: A Survey of Experimental Research. (Draft Paper)," ROCK Working Papers 003, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008.
    9. Roberto Barontini & Stefano Bozzi, 2011. "Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, February.
    10. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & Saeed Askary, 2007. "Directors' Remuneration and Performance in Australian Banking," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1363-1383, November.
    11. Giorgio Brunello & Clara Graziano & Bruno Parigi, 1999. "Ownership or Performance: What Determines Board of Directors' Turnover in Italy?," Working Papers 1999.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    12. Minkler, Lanse, 2004. "Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
    13. Choe, Heungsik & Lee, Bong-Soo, 2003. "Korean bank governance reform after the Asian financial crisis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 483-508, September.
    14. Chalevas, Constantinos G., 2011. "The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 138-174, June.
    15. Hearn, Bruce, 2013. "The impact of board governance on director compensation in West African IPO firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 82-104.
    16. Holm, Claus & Schøler, Finn, 2008. "Reduction of Asymmetric Information through Corporate Governance Mechanisms : The Importance of Ownership Dispersion and International," Accounting Research Center Working Papers A-2008-02, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Business Studies.
    17. Saibal Ghosh, 2006. "Do board characteristics affect corporate performance? Firm-level evidence for India," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(7), pages 435-443.
    18. Ghosh, Saibal, 2007. "Board Diligence, Director Busyness and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis for India," Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 0(Number 1-), pages 1-14.
    19. Elisabetta Bertero & Laura Rondi, 1997. "Does debt discipline state-owned firms? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms," CERIS Working Paper 199711, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY -NOW- Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
    20. Suwina Cheng & Michael Firth, 2006. "Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 549-561.
    21. Roberto Di Pietra & Christos Grambovas & Ivana Raonic & Angelo Riccaboni, 2008. "The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(1), pages 73-91, March.
    22. Loyola, Gino, 2007. "How to sell to buyers with crossholdings," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075025, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    23. Chillemi, Ottorino, 2005. "Cross-owned firms competing in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-19, April.
    24. Kato, Takao & Kubo, Katsuyuki, 2006. "CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-19, March.
    25. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno M., 2003. "CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1027-1051, June.

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