The relation between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance: A Japanese/American comparison
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2015. "To test the implication of Watts' (2003) argument that accounting conservatism increases the efficiency of executive compensation contracts, we investigate the relationship between accounting conserva," CARF F-Series CARF-F-370, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
- Min, Byung-Seong, 2013. "Evaluation of board reforms: An examination of the appointment of outside directors," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 21-43.
- Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2012. "Excess Executive Compensation and the Demand for Accounting Conservatism," Discussion Paper Series DP2012-08, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
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KeywordsCorporate governance Executive compensation Japanese corporations;
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