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Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan

  • Xu, Peng
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WMC-45MFXWB-D/2/0928fc07333b7e021368b1069ad29e68
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.

    Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 319-346

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:319-346
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903

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    1. Takao Kato, 1994. "Chief Executive Compensation and Corporate Groups in Japan: New Evidence from Micro Data," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_117, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
    4. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
    6. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    7. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
    8. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    9. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
    10. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Kanemoto, Y. & Macleod, B., 1989. "Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 116-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    13. Kato, Takao & Rockel, Mark, 1992. "The importance of company breeding in the U.S. and Japanese managerial labor markets: A statistical comparison," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 39-45, May.
    14. Kato, Takao & Rockel, Mark, 1992. "Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 30-51, March.
    15. Ariga, Kenn & Brunello, Giorgio & Ohkusa, Yasushi & Nishiyama, Yoshihiko, 1992. "Corporate hierarchy, promotion, and firm growth: Japanese internal labor market in transition," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 440-471, December.
    16. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    17. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-59, September.
    18. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    19. Garen, John E, 1994. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1175-99, December.
    20. Chang, Chun, 1993. "Payout Policy, Capital Structure, and Compensation Contracts When Managers Value Control," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 911-33.
    21. Jonathan S. Leonard, 1990. "Executive pay and firm performance," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 13-29, February.
    22. Peter F. Kostiuk, 1990. "Firm Size and Executive Compensation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(1), pages 90-105.
    23. Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 486-507, June.
    24. Main, Brian G M & O'Reilly, Charles A, III & Wade, James, 1993. "Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 606-28, October.
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