Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital
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Other versions of this item:
- Kanemoto, Yoshitsugu & Bentley MacLeod, W., 1989. "Optimal labor contracts with non-contractible human capital," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 385-402, December.
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Cited by:
- Hirokatsu Asano & Takahiro Ito & Daiji Kawaguchi, 2013. "Why Has the Fraction of Nonstandard Workers Increased? A Case Study of Japan," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(4), pages 360-389, September.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014.
"Bonus pools and the informativeness principle,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 180-191.
- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 413, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2002.
"U-Type versus J-Type Tournaments,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 614-637, December.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2001. "U-type versus J-type tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 34/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Chun Chang & Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "A framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 91-105, September.
- Moriguchi, Chiaki, 2003.
"Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920–1940,"
The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 625-665, September.
- Chiaki Moriguchi, 2003. "Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920-1940," NBER Working Papers 9559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krakel, Matthias, 2003. "U-type versus J-type tournaments as alternative solutions to the unverifiability problem," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 359-380, June.
- ASANO Hirokatsu & ITO Takahiro & KAWAGUCHI Daiji, 2011.
"Why Has the Fraction of Contingent Workers Increased? A case study of Japan,"
Discussion papers
11021, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Hirokatsu Asano & Takahiro Ito & Daiji Kawaguchi, 2011. "Why Has the Fraction of Contingent Workers Increased? A Case Study of Japan," IDEC DP2 Series 1-3, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
- Fella, Giulio, 2005. "Termination restrictions and investment in general training," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1479-1499, August.
- Kandel, Eugene & Pearson, Neil D., 2001. "Flexibility versus Commitment in Personnel Management," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 515-556, December.
- Chiaki Moriguchi, 2000. "The Evolution of Employment Relations in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Firms, 1900-1960: A Comparative Historical and Institutional Analysis," NBER Working Papers 7939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xu, Peng, 1997. "Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 319-346, September.
- Chiaki Moriguchi, 2003. "Did American Welfare Capitalists Breach their Implicit Contracts? Preliminary Findings from Company-level Data, 1920-1940," NBER Working Papers 9868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kräkel, Matthias, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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Keywords
human resources ; workers ; moral hazard ; contracts ; enterprises ; wages;All these keywords.
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