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U-Type versus J-Type Tournaments

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  • Matthias Kräkel

Abstract

In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that the outcomes of the two tournament types differ substantially. In particular, an employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, but the opposite if it is small.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "U-Type versus J-Type Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 614-614, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200212)158:4_614:uvjt_2.0.tx_2-n
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, pages 105-126.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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