Firm reputation and self-enforcing labor contracts
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- Macleod, W.B. & Kanemoto, Y., 1990. "Firm Reputation And Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9026, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Macleod, W.B. & Kanemoto, Y., 1990. "Firm Reputation and Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9026, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2014.
"Bonus pools and the informativeness principle,"
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- Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 413, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
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