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Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability

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  • Matthias Krakel

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

We discuss two incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice¡Xtournaments and piece rates. The existing literature on the comparison of these two incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited liability. The results show that piece rates dominate tournaments if idiosyncratic risk is sufficiently high despite the partial insurance effect of tournament compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Krakel, 2006. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(3), pages 185-199, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:5:y:2006:i:3:p:185-199
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
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    6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
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    9. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 1998. "The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition," NBER Working Papers 6750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    13. Kräkel, Matthias, 2004. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 15, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentives; piece rates; rank-order tournaments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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