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Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative

Author

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  • Fares, M'hand
  • Orozco, Luis

Abstract

This article analyzes the contractual relationship between a wine cooperative (winery) and its member (growers). This relationship is plagued by moral hazard and adverse selection problems in grape quality. Indeed, growers can be opportunistic since the cooperative is unable to observe: (1) their effort level due to imperfect monitoring technology; and (2) their productive abilities (types) due to adverse selection. Because the growers' vineyard practices and efforts are one of the main determinants of grape quality, the cooperative implements an incentive compensation system to induce growers to make the maximum effort toward the achievement of quality. This compensation scheme is similar to that in tournaments (Green and Stokey, 1983; Knoeber, 1989; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999). In our case, the cooperative promotes competition between growers by offering a promotion to a higher-quality contract, while, at the same time, organizing the contest by creating homogeneous groups of growers using a menu of contracts and monitoring through regular visits to the vineyard. Using a database of 1,219 contracts, we test the effect of: (1) the cooperative's tournament compensation scheme; (2) the menu of contracts and monitoring mechanism. The results of our econometric estimations provide some confirmation of both effects. (JEL classifications: L14, D82, Q13)

Suggested Citation

  • Fares, M'hand & Orozco, Luis, 2014. "Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 320-345, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jwecon:v:9:y:2014:i:03:p:320-345_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Qiao & Hendrikse, George, 2016. "Pooling and the yardstick effect of cooperatives," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 97-105.
    2. Franklin G. Mixon Jr. & Luis R. Gómez-Mejia, 2020. "The Competitive Struggle to Win Tournaments: The Allies’ Race to Capture Adolf Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 23(1), pages 3-17.
    3. Thissen, Hannah Katharina & Schulz, Frederik Nikolai & Hanf, Jon H., 2024. "Producer cooperatives in the wine business in the area of conflict of partial delivery," GEWISOLA 64th Annual Conference, Giessen, Germany, September 25–27, 2024 364732, GEWISOLA.
    4. Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin & Hamilton Stephen & Diogo Souza-Monteiro, 2018. "Free-riding on product quality in cooperatives: lessons from an experiment," Post-Print hal-01815808, HAL.
    5. Rogers A Lumenyela & Provident Dimosso & Tafuteni Chusi, 2023. "Private- Cooperatives Synergy in the Face of Agricultural Policy Changes: Moral Hazard Behavior Ameliorated? An Experience from Coffee Cooperatives in Southern Highlands, Tanzania," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 14(4), pages 11-21.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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