Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
This paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece-rate compensation schemes. Th e informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to i nstall piece-rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century. Th e formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commit ment in contracting. The main result is as follows: in a work environ ment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action, if neit her the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior, then no co mpensation scheme, piece-rate or otherwise, can induce the worker not to restrict output. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1986|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA|
Phone: (617) 253-3361
Fax: (617) 253-1330
Web page: http://econ-www.mit.edu/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Linda Woodbury)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.