Inequity Aversion in Tournaments
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly. The principal never benefits from empathy between the workers, by he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less envious ones when they are low.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP 8888, succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3P8|
Phone: (514) 987-8161
Web page: http://www.cirpee.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Englmaier, Florian & Achim Wambach, 2003.
"Contracts and Inequity Aversion,"
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003
74, Royal Economic Society.
- Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier.
- Levine, David I., 1991.
"Cohesiveness, productivity, and wage dispersion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 237-255, March.
- Levine, David, 1989. "Cohesiveness, Productivity, and Wage Dispersion," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt8kd4d0p4, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1994.
"Satisfaction and comparison income,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2005.
"Envy and Compassion in Tournaments,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 187-207, 03.
- Baker, George P & Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1988.
" Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 593-616, July.
- Hans K. Hvide, 2000.
"Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0163, Econometric Society.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., .
"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation,"
Chapters in Economics,
University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
- Mui, V.L., 1992.
"The Economics of Envy,"
9306, Southern California - Department of Economics.
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
- Krakel, Matthias, 2000. "Relative deprivation in rank-order tournaments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 385-407, July.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
- George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-283.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manuel Paradis)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.