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Contests with multi-tasking

Author

Listed:
  • Clark, Derek J.
  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions, and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework. © The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Clark, Derek J. & Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Contests with multi-tasking," Munich Reprints in Economics 22095, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:22095
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    Cited by:

    1. Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019. "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 419-433.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
    3. João Ricardo Faria & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & Steven B. Caudill & Samantha J. Wineke, 2014. "Two-Dimensional Effort in Patent-Race Games and Rent-Seeking Contests: The Case of Telephony," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-11, May.
    4. Bos, O & P. Schweinzer, 2012. "Risk pooling in redistributive agreements," Discussion Papers 12/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017. "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 199-224.
    6. Deck, Cary & Sarangi, Sudipta & Wiser, Matt, 2017. "An experimental investigation of simultaneous multi-battle contests with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 117-134.
    7. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 33(4), pages 265-277, November.
    8. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2022. "Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-20, September.
    9. Aner Sela, 2022. "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers 2205, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    10. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 740-748.
    11. Kjell Hausken, 2021. "Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(11), pages 1-12, November.
    12. Franke, Jörg & Öztürk, Tahir, 2015. "Conflict networks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 104-113.
      • Franke, Jörg & Öztürk, Tahir, 2009. "Conflict Networks," Ruhr Economic Papers 116, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    13. Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2020. "Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 144-169, November.
    14. Aner Sela, 2025. "Unsolicited prizes in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 65(1), pages 187-210, August.
    15. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
    17. Qiang Fu & Ganesh Iyer, 2019. "Multimarket Value Creation and Competition," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 129-149, January.
    18. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, 2012. "Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 520-538, June.
    19. Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela, 2008. "When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    20. Simiao Li, 2013. "Tullock contests under committee administration," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 1983-1990.
    21. Aner Sela, 2024. "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 721-743, December.
    22. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Additive multi-effort contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 203-248, September.
    23. Deck, Cary & Hao, Li & Porter, David, 2015. "Do prediction markets aid defenders in a weak-link contest?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 248-258.

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    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General

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