IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/snbeco/v1y2021i11d10.1007_s43546-021-00155-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests

Author

Listed:
  • Kjell Hausken

    (University of Stavanger)

Abstract

A rent seeking model is axiomatized where players exert multiple additive efforts which are substitutable in the contest success function. The axioms assume the sufficiency of exerting one effort, and that adding an amount to one effort and subtracting the same amount from a second equivalent substitutable effort keeps the winning probabilities unchanged. In contrast, the multiplicative Cobb–Douglas production function in the earlier literature requires players to exert all their complementary efforts. The requirement follows from assuming a homogeneity axiom where an equiproportionate change in two players’ matched efforts does not affect the winning probabilities. This article abandons the homogeneity axiom and assumes an alternative axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a fixed positive amount is added to all players’ efforts. This article also assumes a so-called summation axiom where the winning probabilities remain unchanged when a player substitutes an amount of effort from one effort into another effort. The summation axiom excludes multiplicative production functions, and furnishes a foundation for additive production functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken, 2021. "Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(11), pages 1-12, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:snbeco:v:1:y:2021:i:11:d:10.1007_s43546-021-00155-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s43546-021-00155-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s43546-021-00155-5
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s43546-021-00155-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Vesperoni & Anil Yildizparlak, 2019. "Contests With Draws: Axiomatization And Equilibrium," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1597-1616, July.
    2. Birendra Rai & Rajiv Sarin, 2009. "Generalized contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 139-149, July.
    3. Cubel, María & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2016. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 92-105.
    4. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    5. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
    6. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi‐tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
    7. Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Helping And Sabotaging In Tournaments," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 211-228.
    8. Kai A. Konrad, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 409-419, Springer.
    9. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    10. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    11. Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-91.
    12. Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang, 2016. "Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 939-957, December.
    13. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    14. Jean-François Mercier, 2018. "Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 927-947, September.
    15. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2021. "Reimbursement as a tool to reduce sabotaging in rent‐seeking contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 235-238, January.
    16. Pavlo Blavatskyy, "undated". "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization," IEW - Working Papers 208, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2010. "Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 267-276, March.
    18. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    19. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262, Springer.
    20. Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, April.
    21. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2015. "Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 127-141.
    22. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    23. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
    24. J. Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2007. "Sabotaging Potential Rivals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 143-162, January.
    25. Michael Carter, 2001. "Foundations of Mathematical Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262531925, April.
    26. Michael Carter, 2001. "Foundations of Mathematical Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032899, April.
    27. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
    28. Bozbay, Irem & Vesperoni, Alberto, 2018. "A contest success function for networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 404-422.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Additive multi-effort contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 203-248, September.
    2. Bozbay, Irem & Vesperoni, Alberto, 2018. "A contest success function for networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 404-422.
    3. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
    4. Alberto Vesperoni, 2016. "A contest success function for rankings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
    5. Cedric Duvinage & Peter-J. Jost, 2019. "The Role of Referees in Professional Sports Contests," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(8), pages 1014-1050, December.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
    7. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2019. "Quantity-cum-quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 289-297.
    8. Cubel, María & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2016. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 92-105.
    9. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang, 2016. "Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 939-957, December.
    11. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Group contest success functions [Group Contest Success Functions]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-20, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, 2012. "Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 520-538, June.
    13. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    14. Aner Sela, 2022. "Ineffective Prizes In Multi-Dimensional Contests," Working Papers 2205, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    15. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2015. "Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 127-141.
    16. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 740-748.
    17. Aner Sela, 2024. "Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 721-743, December.
    18. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Cubel, Maria, 2015. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-49, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    19. Luo, Zijun & Xie, Xin, 2018. "A Model Of rivalries with endogenous prize and strength," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 215-223.
    20. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rent seeking; Additive efforts; Axioms; Contest success function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:snbeco:v:1:y:2021:i:11:d:10.1007_s43546-021-00155-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.